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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

The dissent attacked the majority on grounds ranging from procedure to substantive law. The dissent stated that summary judgment
was usually inapplicable in equity matters. The dissent also stated that
the legislative history of Georgia's statutory definition of navigability
did not support the court's narrow construction of the term "navigability." Furthermore, the dissent stressed that statutes should be interpreted as codification of the common law unless otherwise explicitly
contrary, as the statute was in this case, and that navigability is a federal
question whereby the court was compelled to consider navigability under both state and federal law.
Amy W Beatie

ILLINOIS
Independent Trust Corp. v. Chicago Dep't of Water, 693 N.E.2d 459
(M11. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that a hydrant lead is not "firefighting
equipment or facilities" within the meaning of the Tort Immunity
Act).
The basement of 205 West Randolph Street in Chicago flooded on
February 20, 1994. The water department discovered the basement
and subbasement filled with over ten feet of water. Water department
employees removed the water and investigated the cause of the leak.
They observed multiple hairline cracks in the hydrant lead, a six-inchdiameter pipe connecting an adjacent fire hydrant to an underground
water main. This pipe caused the flooding to occur.
Plaintiffs, Independent Trust Corp. and First Management Realty
Corp. owned the building. Pago Pago II, Inc. and Corporation Supply
Company, Inc. each operated a business in the building. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company was a subrogee of Corporation Supply. All three plaintiffs filed separate suits against the city and the
court consolidated their cases. Each alleged the city negligently maintained, inspected, or repaired the pipe. The circuit court granted the
city's motion to dismiss because the hydrant lead was "firefighting
equipment or facilities" within the meaning of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the "Act").
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois.
The appellate court held that the hydrant lead was not "firefighting equipment or facilities" within the meaning of section 5-103(a) of
the Act and, therefore, the lower court erred in granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The court declared the city not immune
from liability in this case.
The court first analyzed the Act. The Act does not grant general
immunity to municipal water providers. Unless their specific conduct
falls within another section of the Act, the water provider may be held
liable. Defendants argued immunity under section 5-103(a) which
states: "Neither a local public entity, nor a public employee acting in
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the scope of his employment, is liable for an injury resulting from the
condition of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities."
The record showed, however, that no problem ever existed with the
hydrant itself, but only with the pipe.
The court then looked to the legislative intent of the Act. In analyzing the plain language of the statute, the court found immunization
of the city for injuries resulting from the condition of the "firefighting
equipment or facilities." The court stated it must give these words
their ordinary and popularly understood meaning because the statute
did not provide a definition. "Facility" referred to a structure and
clearly did not apply in this instance. The court stated that the hydrant itself could be considered "equipment" but, the pipe, as part of
the underground water system, could not. If immunity went further
than this the court would be going against the clear congressional intent of the Tort Immunity Act.
Melinda Barton

Gernand v. Ilinois Commerce Comm'n and Consumers M. Water Co.,
286 M11. App. 3d 934 (LI. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the Illinois Public Utilities Act authorized the Consumers Illinois Water Company to
obtain a temporary easement over landowners' land for testing purposes).
In response to nitrate problems discovered by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency required Consumers Illinois Water Company ("CIWC") to
execute a letter of commitment saying it would lower the nitrate levels
in the water it supplied to its customers to comply with federal primary
drinking water standards. In order to comply the CIWC chose a
groundwater blending option. CIWC filed a petition with the Illinois
Commerce Commission (the "Commission") requesting a certificate of
convenience and necessity under section 8-406 of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act (the "Act") and orders under sections 8-503 and 8-509
which would authorize CIWC to obtain, by eminent domain, temporary easements for test-boring surveys, constructing test wells, extracting groundwater, and measuring the effect of groundwater removal on
the water supply in a rural area of Vermilion County, Illinois.
The affected landowners were granted leave to intervene. The
Commission entered an order allowing the petition, and denied landowners' application for a re-hearing. Landowners filed a timely petition forjudicial review.
The landowners argued that they did not cite statutory authority
before the Commission for a utility to drill for water because the trial
court did not rely upon provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code. The
necessary provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code permit a water
company such as CIWC to relocate its source of supply to a point less
than 20 miles beyond the corporate limits of the municipality served,

